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OF THE RIGHTS OF PARTN1E]S}IIP CREDITORAS
IN THE SEPA!LATE PROPERTY
OF A PARTNER.
The separate property of a :artner con-
sists of that which he owns aside from others, and
that which he possesses in conjunction with others.
As to the former class there car. be no question as
to what it is; it stands out distinct, unhampered
by the questions of joint ownership. The latter,
however, vuili admit of a preliinary examination.
A rartnershir is a relation created by the
"conrtract of to or --,orc persons to -!lace their
money, effects, labor and shill, or some or all of
them in lawful coLzicrce, or business, and to divide
the profits and bear the losses in certain propor-
tions." (3 Kent's Canm., 23) It involves the
joint ownership of property. The question which
-2-
arises in this conncction is, What is a :partner's
interest therein? it is a chose in action.
(Staats v. Bristow, 73 N.Y., 204) It is not the
interest of a tenant in com=mon either at law or in
equity. Tenants in coiwm.on do not contemplate a
division of the p-ofits while together. On the
other hand, a sharing of the profits is a vital
characteristic of a partnershi-. The members of a
firm depend upon each other for the make up, or e.r-
sonnel, of the concern. it is a machine, so to
speak, compose. of different members working harmon-
iously to accomplish the same purpose. Fach mem-
ber is selected by the others for his particular
ability along certain lines. In other words, it
is a personal t-,-t, .d can not be delegated. It
cannot be the interest oj a tcranI ii, cor=on for then
the fundamental purpose of tho relation woiuld be
destroyed. What right should one partner have to
substitute for himself, a stranger, whose connec-
tion with the firm '7as never in the contemplation
of the partners? (Burnett v. Snyder, 70 N.Y., 344)
The necessity, in business affairs carried on by
partnershils, for the utmost good faith in all trans-
actions, negatives such a proposition. On account
of this inviolability of the rights of the other
partners, the introduction of a new member, or rather,
the atterapted introduction of such an one, dissolves
the firm, (Mlarquand v. N.Y.Manuf.Co., 17 Johns.,
525) though Lindley, in his worn on partnership,
qualifies this statement by stating that a partner-
ship at will would be thus dissolved, but that in
one not at rill this act simply gives the other
partners a cause for dissolution. The authority
cited has been approved in later opinions in the
same jurisdiction and allows no qualification of the
rule, though Lindley's reasoning is sound. (Lindley
on Partnership, 303)
A pa-tner has no undivided interest in the
firm property of which he can dispose; it is a right
to an accounting--an ascertainment of the amount
over and above the liabilities of the concern.
Such a right is enforced in equity and thither should
-3-
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a partner, or one oco'pying his position, seek re-
lief. So that, if the p-rtner's interest is taken
to satisfy the claims of his creditors, they can
reach nothing but what that share represents in the
final accounting. A sheriff, with an execution,
reaches nothing more. He cannot sell an undivided
interest; its non-existence prevents.that. if his
levy be on all the goods of the firm, in satisfying
the claim against the debtor-partner, he can sell but
this same interest. Taken in the light of the de-
cisions, a partner's interest as a chose in action,
has been held to be barred by the lapse of time pre-
scribed by the statute of limitations. (Knox v.
Gye, 5 L.R.Eng.& ir.4pp., 656)
Upon the death of a 'rartn.er, and the con-
sequent dissolution of the firm, the legal interest
in the assets goes to the surviving members and they
have the exclusive right to sell, mortgage, and dis-
pose of them in the performance of their dutiesin
closing up the affairs of the partnership as they
deem best for all parties interested. This legal
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title of the survivors is held subject, however, to
the equitable rihts of the representatives of the
deceased partner to have a proper apilication made
of the proceeds. So that they m-y require the due
application of the assets to the pyraent of partkLer-
ship debts, but the time, manner, and mode of so
doing are :,urely matters of administration anmd, as
such, under the exclusive control of the surviving
partners. The interest of there representatives,
is, then, a mere contingency which may, or may not,
ripen into a legal right, upon the existence, or non-
existence, of a surplus after the ray-ent of all the
debts.
It is generally stated that partition of
partnership cannot be had, and, although there are
cases cited at times as holding the contrary view,
they are few in number, and some of them, at least,
doubtful authorities. A moments reflection will
call to mind substantial reasons in support of the
proposition. How can you have partition in such a
case? The partner's interest is not a tangible;
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an ascertained quantity. He has not even an un-
dividel interest. What he will receive depends up-
on the existence of surplus assets after the payment
of all the debts. In what way can a mere naked
right be divisible? Surely there must be a definite
thing in order to have partition, and if that does
not exist, hov cal it be had? But a partner can
comiel a sale of the partnership property. This
he accompllshes by means of the right he has, upon
dissolution, to have the whole assets disposed of in
a'justment of matters between the partners. (Wild
v. Milne, 26 Beaven, 504)
Having deter ained the character of the
separate property of a partner, the next step is, in
this article, to determine how it is affected by var-
ious situations in which it figures. it will ap-
pear, then, that a discussion of this question best
resolves itself into, and may be stated under the
following classes, or typical cases: (a) The Liabil-
ity of the Separate Property to Prouess on a Firm
Debt; (b) The Assignment of Separate Property by a
-7-
Partner for a Partnershil: Debt; (c) The Distributiol
of the Separate Property of a Ban7zrupt Partner;ald;
(d) The Distribution of the Separate Estate of a
Deceased Partner.
The Liability of the Separate Property to
Process on a Firm Debt.
The question in this class of cases gen-
erally arises where there are conflicting claims of
partnership and separate creditors. The Individ-
ual creditor insists that his debt only shall be
satisfied from the separate estate, while the firm
creditor maintains that he shall share in the separ-
ate estate because he exte:.ded credit upon the faith
of the liability of each and every partner, jointly
and severally. 7nat justice can there be in saying
that"A" have a claim against !'X,, and "Y", co-partners,
"B", a creditor of "Y", can compel "A" to seek sat-
isfaction from the estate of "X" alone, whether it
be sufficient to cancel the debt or not? Surely
no such right can exist, unless "Y", for his own
sake, has a right in equity, to co-el A' to see',
payment from that source. Thoiifgh the well estab-
lished equity rule is, that, as between the joint
and separate creditors of partners, the partnership
property is to be first applied to the payment of the
partnership debts, and the sepa.rate pro-erty of the
individual partners to the paynent of their secar-
ate debts; and that neither class of creditors can
claim anything from the fund which belongs primarily
to the opposite class until all the claims of the
latter are satisfied, it is limited in its appli-
cation to equitable assets only. Equity tribunals
had never sought to over-ride, or in any way inter-
fere with an absolute right of priority at law.
So that the existence at law of the right of firm
creditors to pursue both the joint and separate
estates, to the extent of each, for the satisfacticn
of their joint demands, has been given full faith
and credlit in equity. (Meech v. Allen, 17 N.Y., 300)
The position is even stronger where an absoaute right
-10-
of legal priority is given by force of a positive
statute, as in the case of a judgment. This rule
at law is not with out reason. Each partler is
liable in solido for the debts of the partnership
and, though technically it has been called a joint
liability, yet each is liable for the entire debt.
But a several suit cannbt be brought to enforce it.
The judgment should be against all the partners,
but the execution may be enforced against so many
of them as will cancel the debt, and a firm creditor
with a first execution against the individual rrop-
erty of a partner takes precedence of a separate
creditor with a second execution against the swae
prorerty.
On the other hand, if equity did not fol-
low the law in this case, princiyles a-crlied by
that tributal could be resorted to and both the as-
sets of the partnership and of the in-ividual rart-
ner would be saved to the firm creditor. This re-
sults from the aprlication of what is technically
termed "the rartner's equity.,' Each partner has
-l1-
the personal right in equity to have the assets of
the partnership first applied to the payment of the
firm debts, and by a subrogation recognized in
chancery, the joint creditors receive the benefit
of this right. This is not the rule followed,
however, for, as was previously stated, equity fol-
lows the lgw.
The Assignment of Separ-ate Property y a
Partner for a Partnership Debt.
As a r1rimary rrorosition under this divis-
ion, the rtile may be stated to be, that a partner,
while he has control of his own -roperty, and even
when he becomes insolvcnt (Crook v. Rindskolf, 105
N.Y., 482) has the e-fect legal right to aply his
individual, as well as yartnership, propuerty to the
payment of the partnershi-, debts, because he is under
the legal obligation as a member of the firm to pay
the debts owing by the firm, or by himself as a mem-
ber thereof. (Smith v. Howard, 20 How.Pr.Rop., 124)
And this obligation is just as binding and perfect
in its nature and effect as is the obligation to pay
an individual indebtednesz. The force of this rule
may be appreciated when it is stated that the rights
of the partnership creditors are so carefully guard-
ed that a transfer made, or a lien given, by one
member of the firm, transferring or incumbering the
eerpus of the partnership property to pay, or secure
an ihdividual debt, is void as to such creditors,
unless it is shown that the firm is solvent and suf-
ficient assets remain to cancel the partnership in-
debtedancs¢(Menagh v.Whitwell, 52 N.Y., 146)
There are two ways by means of which he
may dispose of such property, however, and the
transfers will be valid. They are, first, where
the firm is solvent and sufficient property remains
to pay the partnership debts; and, second, where a
bonafide sale has been made by a retiring partner
in a solvent firm of two members, to his co-partner,
the latter assuming the debts. By this transfer
the property, formerly belonging to the firm,becomes
the separate property of the purchasing partner, and
the partnership creditors are not entitled to any
preference as against his individual creditors in
case of his subsequent insolvency. This is a set-
tled rule of law.(Ex parte Ruffin, 6 Ves. 119;
Dimon v. Hazard, 32 N.Y., 65) Such transfer is
not to be taken, however, as the sole act of the
one partner. It is the act of both partners joint-
ly, for it is participated in by both, and they,
having the power to dispose of the corpus of the
joint property, and exercising that power bona fide,
can divest the title of the firm as effectually as
if they had joined in a transfer to a stranger, for
it must be conceded that the creditors have no lien
which.would affect the title of a purchaser from
the firm. But so long as the property remains in
the possession of the purchasing partner, it is li-
able to execution for partnership debts.
A proper question in this connection is
in regard to the effect of transfers of the partner's
chose in action on the rights of creditors. Where
the character of the property remains unchanged and
no act has been done by the firm to divest its ti-
tle, will the transfer, by the partners, of their
respective individual interests to different per-
sons operate to discharge them from the claims of
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firm creditors, or will the interests still remain
subject, in the hahds of the transferees, to the de-
mands of those creditors? There are conflicting
views on this question. The rule adopted by the
Supreme Court of the United States, in Case v, Beau-
regard, ( 99 U.S., 119) is to the effect that so
long as the equity of a partner to have the prop-
erty applied to the satisfaction of the partnership
debts remains, just so long can the joint creditors
have a remedy against the property, but when it is
gone, the rights of the creditors are lost. In
this case, the court say, " The joint estate is
converted into the separate estate of the assignee
by force of the contract of assignment, and it
makes no difference whether the partner sells to
the other partners, or to a third person, or
whether the sale is made by him, or under a judg-
ment against him. In either case the equity is
gone.' It declares, in effect, that a partner
loses his right to have the firm assets applied to
the payment of the firm debts; that his right so to
do is not yersonal.
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On the contrary, the other and bettcr view
is emhatically stated by Judge Rapallo in Mena.h
v. 7Thltwell, (supra) It is, " that the title of
the firm, as between it and its creditors, to the
corlus of the property, or at least to so much of
it as is necessary for the debts, is not divested
by these separate transfers to strangers." He
further declares that the equity of a partner to
have the partnership property applied to the pay-
ment of the partnership debts, is a personal right
of which the partner cannot divest himself by a
sale of his interest. To quote the learned judge's
language, " Could i t be tolerated that the interest
of a partner should be sold under execution against
him, on which sale only the value of his interest
in the surplus could be realized, abd that the pur-
chaser should be allowed to take the corlous of the
property and leave him liable for the debts ?" A
partner cannot transfer to his assignee more than
he himself is entitled to, namely, his share after
all accounts have been taken. ( Hanhkey v. Garrett,
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1 Ves., 241, Am. Ed. note ; Young v. Keighly, 15
Ves., 557 ) No person deriving under a partner
can be in a better condition than the partner him-
self. ( Fox v. Hanbury, Cowp. 445 ) Neither can a
partner, by an assignment of his interest take from
the creditors, or other partners, the right to have
their claims against the firm satisfied out of ite
property, Hence a mortgage, made by one partner,
of his undivided interest, cannt avail against the
creditors of the partnership who attach the partner-
ship property. ( Lovejoy v. Bowers, 11 N .H., 404)
It would seem that enough has been written to dem-
onstrate that the better and more logical view is
the one which protects the partnership creditors and
does not dissolve the firm as to them.
The Distribution of te Separate PzirL
of a Bankrupt Partner.
Born of the Roman law, fostered by the
courts of Spain and Fn-land, and a'2o-ted by the
judiciary of the United States, the rule, that
partnershi; property shall first satisfy partner-
chip debts and soparate proyerty first satisfy in-
dividual debts, has become firmly embraced in the
laT- gcverning bankrupts, assignees arcd insolvents.
Could the good fathers of the Civil la"7 have knovim
v.hat uneasi~ess they have occasioned mofc:- co =..er-
eii. lcxuycrc, and the r-any sile: t mCrledictions 1--
b -e at o a host .of ju-c s ",ho ave b-eon fomccd
to ::>7it its existepoo, tho7gh doi- a- rs
they would have repented long since in sack-cloth
and ashes. The courts of England were in a state
of delightful uncertainty for noarilra century as to
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the adoption of the rule in that jurisdiction,
until finally Lord Loughborough, in 1796, in the
6aso of Ex rarte Elton, ( 3 Vos., 238 ) squarely
ancd forcibly enunciates the rule a st.t(d. Like
all :'~.-es it has boon subjected to objections,
.:hich, in this insta-ce, have bo no-n t a Fe' in
number. The result has been to withhold the appli-
cation of the rule where the joint creditors have
no fund or ncans of satisfaction of any zinc, which
is the case where there is no joint estate and no
living solvent partner. Both conditions must co-
exist, however. Just what " no joint estate
means has been a hone of contention, but it nows
appears to be well settled that if the joint cred-
itors can get a dividend from the partnership estate,
no matter how small, theyl cannot share with the
separate creditors in the separate estate; and, it
is said, that if the joint estate is so small as to
be entirely consumed in costs, there is no joint
estate. (Bates on Partnership, see. 833) Where
there is no living solvent partner, the joint cred-
-20-
itors cannot prove jari p with the separate
creditors in the individual estate. By this is
meant a partner from whom no fund, however small,
can be derived. (Bates on Partnership, sec. 835)
And it seems that his mere insolvency does not, as
would his bankruptcy, entitle the firm creditors to
prove upon the other partner's separate estate,
( Wilder v. Keeler, 3 Paige, 167; Rodgers v. hLer-
anda, 7 0. St., 179; Cleghorn v. Bank, 9 Ga. 319;
Emanuel v. Bird,lAla., 596; Sperry's Estate, 1
Ashmead, 347 ) but this is doubted by some author-
ities. ( Merrill v. Neili, 8 How., 414; Weyer v.
Thornburgh, 15 Ind., 124 )
There has been not a little discussion as
to the arbitrary character of this rule, but aside
from the fact that its adoption was to give a corr-
elative to the rule admitting separate creditors to
participation in the surplus remaining from the
partnership fund after the payment of the joint
obligations, there are substantial reasons in its
support. Chief Judge Bartley, in Rod-ers v. Moran-
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da, (supra) has stated these so comprehensively,
that an extended quotation from his learned opinion
in that case, seems justified. "Thrat then,"
Judge Bartley says, "is the true foundation of the
rule which gives the individual creditor a prefer-
ence over the partnership creditor in the distri-
bution of the separate estate of a partner? To
say that it is a rule of general equity, as has
been sometimes said, is not a satisfactory solution
of the difficulty; for the very question is,
whether it be a rule of equity or not. In the
distribution of the assets of insolvents, equality
is equity; and to say that the rule which gives the
individual creditor a preference over the partner-
ship creditor in the sep~arate estate of a partner,
is a rule of equality, does not still rid the sub-
ject of difficulty. For leaving the rule to
stand, wcgives the p-reference to the joint
creditors in the partnership property, and perfect
equality between the joint and individual creditors
is, perhaps, -rarely obtainable. That it is, how-
ever, more equal a72 just, as a general rule, tham
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any other which can be devised, consistently with
the preference to the partnership creditors in the
joint estate, cannot be successfully controverted.
It originated as a consequence of the rule of pri-
ority of partnership creditors in the joint estate,
and for the purposes of justice, became necessary as
a correlative rule. W7ith what semblahce of equity
could one class of creditors, in preference to the
rest, be exclusively entitled to the partnership
fund, and, concurrently with the rest, entitled to
the separate estate of each partner? The joint
creditors are no more meritorious than the separate
creditors; and it frequently happens, that the sep-
arate debts are contracted to raise means to car-ry
on the partnership business. Independent of this
rule, the joint creditors have , as a general thing,
a great advantage over the separate creditors.
Besides being exclusively entitled to the partnership
fund, they take their distributive share in the
surplus of the separate estate of each of the sever-
al partners, after the payment of the separate cred-
-23-
itors of each. it is a rule of equity, that where
one creditor is in a situation to have two or more
distinct securities or funds to rely on, the court
will not allow him, neglecting his other funds, to
attach himself to one of the funds to the prejudice
of those who have a claim upon that, and no other
to depend on. And besides the advantage, which
the joint creditors have, arising from the fact,
that the partnership fund is usually mu.ch the larg-
est, as men in trade, in a great majority of cases,
embark their all, or the chief part of their prop-
erty, in it , and besides their distributive rights
in the surplus of the separate estates of the other
partners, the joint creditors have a degree of se-
curity for their debts and facilities for recover-
ing them, which the separate creitors have not;
they can sell both the joint and separate estate on
an execution, while the separate creditor can sell
only the separate property and the interest in the
joint effects that may remain to the partners after
the accounts of the debts and effects of the firm
-24-
are taken, as between the firm and its creditors,
and also as between the partners themselves. With
all these advantages in favor of partnership cred-
itors it would be grossly inequitable to allow them
the exclusive benefit of the joint fund, and then a
concurrent right with individual creditors to an
equal distribution in the separate estate of each
partner. What equality and justice is there in
allowing partnership creditors, who have been paid
eighty per centum on their debts out of the joint
fund, to come in pan rassu with the individual
creditors of one of the partners, whose separate
property will not pay twenty per centum to his sep-
arate.creditors? How could it be said to be an
equal distribution of the assets of insolvents
among their creditors? It is true that an occasion-
al case may arise when the joint effects are pro-
portionably less than the separate assets of an in-
solvent partner. But as a general thing, a very
decided advantage is given to the partnership cred-
itors, notwithstanding this preference of the
individual creditors in the separate property.
And that advantage, arising out of the nature of a
partnership contract, is unavoidable. Some gener-
al rule is necessary; and that must rest on the
basis of the unalterable preference of the part-
nership creditors in the joint effects, and their
further right to some claim in the separate prop-
erty of each of the several partners. The pref-
erence, therefore, of the individual creditors of
a partner in the distribution of his separate estate,
results, as a principle of equity, from the prefer-
ences of partnership creditors in the -artnership
fumds, and their advantages in having different
funds to resort to, while the individual creditors
have but the one."
Contrary to this are arrayed reasons,
apparently substantial, but upon mature consider-
ation, not so convincing. Briefly, they are, that
the rule is not founded u1on principle; that the
creditors of the firm are also creditors of each
partner, while the separate creditors of one partner
-20-
are not creditors of the firm; and, that such a
rule affords facility for shifting f'unds from one
portion of one's estate to another, to which it may
be said in reply, that such will always be the case
where a debtor may prefer a creditor by paying or
securing one and not another.
There is a rule in force in Kentucky 7hich
is a modificatfon of the proposition, to the effect
that where a firm is insolvent and there are part-
nership and separate estates, and both classes of
creditors, the firm creditors, having exhausted the
joint estate, must wait, before proceeding against
the separate estate, until the individual creditors
have received an equal percentage from the separate
estate, than the two classes share Tari 2assu in
the balance. ( Northern Bank of Kentucky v. Keiser,
2 Duval, 169 ) In declaring this rule, the
learned judge frankly admitted that the principle
was long and well established, but seemed to over-
look considerations vital to his proposition .
Such is the situation of the law on this
-27-
branch of the question. '7.ile there are reasons
in favor of each of the several positions, the pre-
ponderance of authority is in favor of the old es-
tablished rule so forcibly laid down by Lord Lough-
borough, in Ex parte Elton.
The Distribution of the Se-.arate Estate
of a Deceased Partner.
Partnership creditors reach the estate of
a deceased partner in equity. As t6 the time when
they can reach it, there are conflicting views, the
generally excepted rule in the United States being
that inability to collect from the surviving partner
must be shown before proceeding in equity, while
in England, the courts have allowed them to proceed
in equity the same as they would at law.
For a considerable length of time prior
to thecase of Devaynes v. Noble, ( I Mer., 397 )
the decisions of the English Court 'of Chancery seem
to have been in harmony with the New York view.
There were various reasons for the change, but the
particular and important one was that in the earlier
cases it had been assumed that the liability in
equity of the estate of the deceased partner was
brought about by a species of equitable transfer to
the creditor of the right of the surviving partners
to insist that the estate of their late associate
should contribute to the payment of the debts of
the firm, but upon its being held subsequently that
the obligations of partners were to be regarded as
joint and several, the English courts said, that,.in
all cases of that kind, creditors had a right to
pursue their remedies against all or either of
their debtors. As a natural consequence of the
adoption 6f this view, they held that the creditors
might proceed immediately dn equity against the
represohtatives of a deceased partner regardless of
the fact as to whether thej had exhausted their
legal remedy against the surviving partners. The
New York courts did not follow this Change and their
decision, in do declining, seems to be supported by
sound reasoming. The course of the English courts
naturally led to the application in an equity pro-
ceeding of the strict legal rules applicable to
-30-
suits at law and the setting aside of many equitable
considerations of great force. These have been
very clearly stated by Judge Selden, in Vogrhis vx,
CAIlds' Executors. ( 17 N.Y., 354 ) He says, in
part, " The surviving partners succeed primarily to
all the rights and interests of the partnership.
They have the entire control of the partnership
property and the sole right to collect the partner-
ship dues. The assets of the firm are of course
to be regarded as the primary fund for the payment
of the partnership debts, and it would seem equitable
at least, that the parties having the exclusive
possession of the fund should be first called upon.
The answer given to this by the English courts,
that the representatives have their remedy over,
seems hardly satisfactory. The presumption is,
that the pri"mary fund is sufficient to meet the
demands upon it. Why then permit in equity a re-
sort to another fund and tht.s give rise to a second
action for its reimbursement? Besides, these Eng-
lish decisions permitting the creditors to proceed
-31-
in the first instance in equity against the estate
of the deceased partner, are in conflict with the
established doctrine that parties must first ex-
haust their legal remedies before resorting to courts
of equity. This rule is well settled in New York
and has been followed in many American cases.
The estate of the deceased partner may
be released from liability to creditors by acts of
the parties conclustvely showing such an intention.
The different holdings of the English and American
tribunals, however, affect the results.
In a case in which it was sought to hold
the estate of a deceased partner, it was set up as
a defence that an agreement had been made with the
survivors whereby the money due the creditors was
contributed by the deceased as capital to the co-
partnership newly formed by the survivors. it was
held that if such defence was affimatively proven
it would be valid , but it could not be inferred
from the fact that the creditor dealt exclusively
with the survivors and recgnized them as his debt-
-32-
ors. He could do this as they were his exclus:ve
debtors at la; and his primary debtors in equity,
without in any way 2elinquishing the secondary
liabilkty of the deceased partner. (Forgarty v.
Cullen, 49 Super. Ct.,397)
In anothor case a partnership was dis-
solved by agreement; one of the partners was to
settle the affairs. Shortly afterwards the other
partner died. One of the creditors thereafter ac-
cepted a note signed by the surviving artner, and
on his subsequent insolvency, brought an action
against the estate of the deceased. It was held
that the acceptance of the note under these circum-
stances did not indicate any intention to release
the estate of the deccased partner. (Titus v. Todd,
25 N.J.Eq., 458)
So much for the American examples. One
of the English decisions is founain the case of
Bilborowuh v. Holmes, (L. R. 5 Ch. D. 255) in
which a firm consisting of two partners was in the
habit of issuing deposit notes. After issuing a
number of these, they took in two new partners. One
of the old firm died. The business was adverti sod
to be continued under t'ie old firm name. The re-
maining old partner died and the business was car-
ried on by the new partners. Subsequently the
firm went into bankruptcy and all the holders of
these notes proved their claims in only this pro-
ceeding. 1When, later, an action was begun to set-
tle the estate of the partner who first died, the
holders of the notes asked to be admitted as cred-
itors. They were all holders of notes at the time
the testator died and had all received interest
from the new partners. All knew of the death of
the testator and had never before made a claim, but
some had not altered the amount after deposit,
others had increased it and had received new de-
posit notes from the new partners, and still others
had diminished it and had also received new notes.
It.was held that as to all claims, the acceptance
of interest by the new partners worz.ed a complete
novation and released the estate of the old partners.
Such is the result of a conscientious
effort to present acceptably the results of an in-
vestigation of this subject. Flaws there are, un-
doubtedly, but it is to be remembered that the
theme is one worthy a master's mind--a distinction
the present writer cannot claim.
